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WATER MARKETING AS AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE
TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Jonathan H. Adler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Water is essential for human civilization.1 It can be a wellspring for
prosperity and a source of conflict.2 For the United States and many other
nations, ensuring access to quality water supplies is among the most pressing
environmental policy challenges of the twenty-first century – and it is a
challenge that water institutions are failing to meet.3 Water use already
exceeds the carrying capacity of natural systems in many places and
continues to increase.4 Demographic changes and existing water use patterns
have placed tremendous pressures upon water supplies, particularly in the
West. In 2003, a majority of states anticipated water shortages over the
subsequent decade, even in the absence of drought conditions.5 Water policy
experts contend, without exaggeration, that “the United States is heading
toward a water scarcity crisis.”6
Global climate change will exacerbate pressures on water resources.7
Although news reports devote more space to the potential threat of rising
*

Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. The author would like to thank Andrew Morriss
and Roger Meiners for their comments and Tai Antoine for her research assistance. All errors
or omissions remain those of the author.
1
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation
States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (“On the scale of basic
biological needs, water no doubt ranks higher than electricity.”).
2
Control over water supplies is a consistent source of friction between states.
See, e.g., Greg Bluestein, Drought Has Georgia Revisiting Border Dispute, WASH. POST, Feb.
10, 2008, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/02/09/AR2008020902283.html (describing boundary and water dispute between
Georgia and Tennessee).
3
The World Health Organization reports four out of ten people worldwide are
already impacted by water scarcity. See World Health Organization, 10 Facts About Water
Scarcity, Mar. 20, 2007, available at http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/water/en/
index.html.
4
TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 1 (1997) (stating “our water use is depleting and exceeding the limits of
natural systems in many parts of the world”).
5
G. Tracy Mehan, III, Energy, Climate Change, and Sustainable Water
Management, DAILY ENVT. REP., Dec. 4, 2007, at 4.
6
Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1873, 1873 (2005). According to Glennon, “our current water use practices are unsustainable,
and environmental factors threaten a water supply heavily burdened by increased demand.” Id.
7
Kathleen A. Miller, Steven L. Rhodes, & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Water
Allocation in a Changing Climate: Institutions and Adaptation, 35 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157,
157 (1997) (stating “global warming may have profound impacts on water resource
availability”).
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sea-levels, for many places “diminished supplies of fresh water may prove a
far more serious problem.”8 For the United States in particular, the climatic
effect on water is significantly more ominous than that on coastline. Some
water officials go so far as to liken the impact of a dramatic decline in water
resources to “Armageddon.”9
Whereas there has been substantial research on the potential effect of
climate change upon water resources, there has been relatively little
consideration of the role of institutional arrangements in mitigating (or
exacerbating) the potential effects of warming-induced changes in water
supplies.10 Climate change increases the urgency with which water managers
and policymakers must address water supply concerns, moving toward water
supply institutions and policies that are sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and
robust to deal with the uncertain water future. As the IPCC has concluded,
“changes in water management practices will have a very significant impact
on how climate change affects the water sector.”11 There is “great and
arguably unavoidable” uncertainty with regard to future climate change and
other potential impact on water supplies, including changes in population and
relevant technologies.12 More efficient water distribution and allocation
institutions are necessary. The inefficiencies inherent in existing water
institutions are a luxury we can no longer afford.
This article argues that climate change, and its projected effects on
water use and supply, calls for a fundamental reexamination of water
institutions. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel On Climate
Change (IPCC) has noted that there are numerous policy options that “would
generate net social benefits regardless of whether there was a climate
change.”13 Examples of such “no regrets” policies would include the
elimination of irrigation and development subsidies that artificially increase
water demand, as well as the incorporation of environmental values into
existing water institutions.14 This article suggests that the gradual

8

Jon Gertner, The Future Is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 20645374.
9
Id.
10
Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 157 (Researchers “have given
less attention to the role of institutional factors in determining the efficacy of alternative
response strategies.”).
11
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY –
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 197 (James J. McCarthy, et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII].
12
Stacy K. Tanaka, et al., Climate Warming and Water Management Adaptation
for California, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 361, 367 (2006); see also Miller, Rhodes &
MacDonnell, supra note 7 at 159 (“we must now accommodate competing water demands
within the context of increasing hydrologic uncertainty.”).
13
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 219-21.
14
Id. at 221.
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implementation of water markets is also such a “no regrets” policy.15 Many
aspects of water markets, including their flexibility, decentralized nature, and
ability to create and harness economic incentives, make them particularly
well suited to address the uncertain water forecast. A gradual shift toward
water marketing and market pricing will improve the management of water
supplies, ensure more efficient allocation of available water supplies, and
encourage cost-effective conservation measures.
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of current climate
change projections and their expected impact on water supplies and use
patterns. That climate change will have an effect on water availability is
quite certain. Yet, the precise outcome of such effects is uncertain. Indeed,
the ultimate effect of climate change on water resources is essentially
unpredictable. This uncertainty increases the need for water institutions that
are flexible and capable of responding to unanticipated changes in water
supplies and demands.
Part III explains why water markets are an appropriate institutional
response to the particular challenges posed by climate change. Water markets
have substantial benefits over traditional, centralized planning and
administration, including their flexibility and utilization of decentralized
information. Market-based pricing of water provides additional benefits,
including the creation of incentives for increased efficiency and
conservation. In short, there is a particularly good match between the
primary virtues of water markets and the demands placed on water
institutions by the prospect of climate change.
Part IV of the article offers some preliminary thoughts on how to
manage the transition to market institutions for water. Like all institutional
arrangements, water markets are not perfect. Further, there are political and
administrative obstacles that could impede a move toward greater reliance on
markets for the allocation and pricing of water. Nonetheless, as this section
discusses, water markets have been used to manage water quite effectively in
many parts of the world, and could help mitigate the negative impact of
global climate change on water supplies.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE THREAT OF WATER
SCARCITY
Extensive scientific research suggests human activity is having a
demonstrable effect on the global climate system.16 The anthropogenic
15

The IPCC has also noted the potential value of water markets and tradeable
water rights in addressing climate change-induced water scarcity. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY – CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
191-92 (Martin Parry, et al., eds. 2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII].
16
See William Collins, et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI.
AMER. 68 (Aug. 2007) (noting that the 2007 IPCC report concluded it was “very likely” that
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emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is contributing to a
gradual, but increasingly perceptible, increase in global mean temperatures
that is expected to continue over the next century.17 The precise nature and
degree of the human contribution is unknown, and may even be unknowable
given the complexity of the global climate system. Nonetheless, even if there
was a sizable chance that human activity is having little impact in
comparison to natural fluctuations, the probability of a significant human
impact on the climate system is more than sufficient to warrant
policymakers’ attention.
If climatic projections are correct, some amount of anthropogenic
warming is almost certainly inevitable.18 The accumulation of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere over the past several decades has ensured some
degree of warming over the coming century.19 Political leaders have
considered and debated various emission control policies for decades at the
national and international level. Yet an enforceable global, emission-control
regime remains elusive.20 Even if such a regime was put in place, it is
exceedingly unlikely that it would impose emission controls or other
measures sufficient to result in a significant reduction of projected
warming.21 Policymakers must prepare to deal with the consequences of a
future greenhouse warming today.
Adaptation to an inevitable warming of the climate and its
consequent effects must be a key element of any meaningful climate change
policy. Whereas emission controls and other mitigation measures will not
human activity was responsible for most of late twentieth century warming, whereas the 2001
IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only “likely”).
17
See id., at 65 (“Over the past 20 years, evidence that humans are affecting the
climate has accumulated inexorably, and with it has come ever greater certainty across the
scientific community in the reality of recent climate change and the potential for much greater
change in the future.”). See also CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15.
18
See Collins et al., supra note 16, at 71 (noting that some degree of warming is
unavoidable due to past and present emissions).
19
Roger Pielke, Jr., et al., Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597
(2007) (noting some amount of climate change due to antropogenic emissions is
“unavoidable”).
20
See Juliet Eilprin, Climate Change Compromise Plan Offered in Bali, WASH.
POST, Dec. 15, 2007, at A17.
21
See Pielke et al., supra note 19, at 597 (“Whatever actions ultimately lead to
the decarbonization of the global energy system, it will be many decades before they have a
discernible effect on the climate.”). See also T.M.L. Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4
and Climate Implications, 25 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 2285 (1998) (documenting
the marginal impact on future climate projections of the emission reductions required under
the Kyoto Protocol).
Even if dramatic emission reductions and other mitigation measures (such as carbon
sequestration) could prevent a significant amount of anthropogenic warming over the coming
decades, it is not clear that such policies would be desirable in comparison to other
alternatives. If emission reductions do not generate benefits in terms of climate risk reduction
that are greater than the costs of such reductions and that compare favorably to alternative
policy measures, such as adaptation to potential climate changes, they may be a poor policy
investment.
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produce meaningful results for decades, adaptation has the potential to
reduce the impacts of climatic warming and increase societal resiliency in the
near term.22 As former Environmental Protection Agency official G. Tracy
Mehan notes, “Adaptation offers immediate, tangible, cost-effective, and,
therefore, politically viable methods of coping with climate change.”23
Many potential adaptive measures would have the added benefit of
mitigating existing environmental concerns. In many instances,
“vulnerability to climate-related impacts on society are increasing for reasons
that have nothing to do with greenhouse gas emissions, such as rapid
population growth along coasts and in areas with limited water supplies.”24
Even if the threat of future warming is reduced, existing demographic
changes could nonetheless increase the costs of climate change in some
regions due to its effect on water supplies. Overstretched fresh water
supplies, like many other potential impacts from climate change, are already
a concern.25 The marginal effects of climate change are only marginal
increases on what may already be large costs.26
If the precise nature, scope, and timing of global warming over the
next century remain somewhat uncertain, the consequent effects of such
warming are even more so. Modeling anticipated changes in the climate due
to increased contributions of greenhouse gases is immensely difficult, and is
dependent upon many assumptions of varying reliability.27 Identifying
specific terrestrial effects from such model results is even more difficult.
Another source of uncertainty is the “scale mismatch” between existing
climate models and hydrological models.28
While there is substantial uncertainty about the details of the impact
of climate change on water resources, such uncertainty does not extend to the
likelihood of such changes.29 As the world warms, rising temperatures and

22

Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973, 975

(2007).
Current emissions reductions will mainly benefit future generations,
whereas the momentum already in the climate system drives the nearterm. Faced with imminent warming, adaptation has a faster response
time, a closer coupling with innovation and incentive structures, and
thereby confers more protection more quickly to more people.
23
G. Tracy Mehan, III, Energy, Climate Change, and Sustainable Water
Management, DAILY ENVT. REP., Dec. 4, 2007, at 4. Mehan is quick to add the qualification
that “This is not the same thing as saying it will be easy.”
24
Pielke, et al., supra note 19, at 597.
25
See id. at 598.
26
See id. at 597.
27
S. Vicuna & J.A. Dracup, The Evolution of Climate Change Impact Studies on
Hydrology and Water Resources in California, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 327, 335 (2007) (stating
that “[o]ne major limitation to using GCM output data is that the spatial and temporal
resolution does not match the resolution needed for hydrologic models.”).
28
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11 at 196.
29
See CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 181 (stating that
“[u]ncertainties in climate change impacts on water resources are mainly due to the
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changes in precipitation patterns will impact water resources. “The most
dominant climatic drivers for water availability are precipitation,
temperature, and evaporative demand,” all of which will be influenced by
greenhouse warming.30 According to the IPCC’s 2001 report, “Available
evidence suggests that global warming may lead to substantial changes in
mean annual streamflows, seasonal distributions of flows, and the
probabilities of extreme high- or low-flow conditions.”31
The largest effect climate change will have on water resources is
likely to result from a shift in the timing, location and amount of
precipitation.32 Different amounts of rain and snow at different times in
different places could prove disruptive for many human and ecological
communities. A projected warming of the climate will also produce changes
in rates of evaporation, snowmelt, and soil moisture, with consequent effects
on river flow and groundwater. As the 2007 IPCC report concluded, “A very
robust finding of hydrological impact studies is that warming leads to
changes in the seasonality of river flows where much winter precipitation
currently falls as snow.”33 Even if climate change were not to alter the
volume of precipitation in a local area, it would still “increase the variance of
water flows.”34 In short, “The prospect of climate change . . . creates
considerable uncertainty regarding future water availability.”35
At the regional scale, the nature and extent of these effects are
particularly uncertain.36 While climate models are reasonably consistent in
their temperature projections, there is “greater variability” in their
precipitation projections.37 Existing climate models do not generate
consistent projections about “the direction and magnitude of change in
average annual precipitation” in specific areas.38 According to the IPCC’s
2001 Working Group II Report, “Changes in precipitation are highly
uncertain. There is little agreement across climate scenarios regarding
changes in total annual runoff across North America.”39 Likely changes
include seasonal shifts in snowmelt and runoff, and a reduction in summer
uncertainty in precipitation inputs and less due to the uncertainties in greenhouse gas
emissions, in climate sensitivities, or in hydrological models themselves” (citations omitted)).
30
Id. at 180.
31
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (citations omitted).
32
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 180 (“A robust finding is that
precipitation variability will increase in the future.”).
33
Id. at 183.
34
Anthony C. Fisher & Santiago J. Rubio, Adjusting to Climate Change:
Implications of Increased Variability and Asymmetric Adjustment Costs for Investment in
Water Reserves, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 207, 208, (1997).
35
Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 166.
36
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (stating that
“[h]ydrological cannot yet be forecast reliably at a watershed scale”).
37
Vicuna & Dracup, supra note 27, at 335.
38
E. Elgaali, et al., High Resolution Modeling of the Regional Impacts of Climate
Change on Irrigation Water Demand, 84 CLIMATIC CHANGE 441, 448 (2007).
39
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 737.
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water flows.40 For instance, the IPCC reports “high confidence” in
predictions that warming “will very likely lead to earlier melting and
significant reductions in snowpack in the western mountains” of North
America.41 The 2007 assessment also reported that “[f]reshwater resources
will be affected by climate change across Canada and the U.S., but the nature
of the vulnerabilities varies from region to region.”42 A warmer climate will
also increase “the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere and evaporation
into the atmosphere,” which is likely to produce greater climate variability.43
This, in turn, is likely to produce “more intense precipitation and more
droughts.”44 As one recent review summarized: “Climate change will affect
not only initial surface runoff into a stream system, but also rates of
evaporative loss, seepage to groundwater aquifers, recharge from those
aquifers and rates of consumptive use from irrigation withdrawals along the
entire stream system.”45
Some changes have already been observed, though the direct link to
anthropogenic warming may be difficult to demonstrate. Non-climatic
drivers of change in water systems remain greater than climate-related
changes.46 Nonetheless, the IPCC’s 2007 report concluded that “there is
evidence of a broadly coherent pattern of change in annual runoff” and
“abundant evidence” of changes in seasonal snow cover and a reduction in
the timing and volume of resulting runoff in North America.47 It is too early
to identify the timing and extent of such changes with any precision. At this
point, however, seasonal changes in runoff are easier to predict than changes
in annual runoff or the regional distribution of such changes.48 A reduction in
snow accumulation periods, for example, seems particularly likely.49 As one
recent study noted, the most significant and predictable impact of a modest
warming “would be a large reduction in mountain snowpack and a
commensurate reduction in natural water storage.”50
Climatic effects on water resources will vary from place to place.
Recent reviews of river flow trends in the United States have found
significant trends in almost thirteen percent of river catchments, with as
40

Id.
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 627.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 176.
44
Id.
45
Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 167.
46
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 176.
47
Id. at 90.
48
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (“In general, there is
greater confidence in projections of seasonal shifts in runoff and related hydrological
characteristics than there is in projections of changes in annual runoff. Regional patterns of
precipitation change are highly uncertain.”).
49
Id. at 745 (“Projections of shorter snow accumulation appear to be more
robust.”).
50
Tim Barnett, et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the
West: Introduction and Overview, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 6 (2004).
41
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many experiencing increased river flow as are experiencing decreased river
flows.51 Some regions will also be more sensitive to climatic changes than
others. Arid and semi-arid portions of the United States, for example, “will
be particularly sensitive to any changes in temperature and precipitation,”
particularly when compared to other regions.52 At present, most climate
models project a reduction in precipitation in the southwest United States.53
Global warming’s effects on water supplies will be compounded by
changes in water demand for various uses as communities adapt to changing
temperatures and precipitation patterns.54 For example, warmer, drier
weather that results in increased evaporation will have an effect on weathersensitive water uses.55 Water use for irrigation, for example, is likely to
increase along with global temperatures, unless temperature increases are
offset by increases in precipitation.56 This is significant because irrigation is
responsible for a majority of consumptive water use.57
Despite the various uncertainties, one conclusion of recent analyses
is that “even with a conservative climate model, current demands on water
resources in many parts of the West will not be met under plausible future
climate conditions, much less the demands of a larger population and a larger
economy.”58 According to some model estimates, the American West could
be faced with a thirty to seventy percent decline in snowpack by the latter
part of the twenty-first century.59 Yet “even if there were no change in the
variability of precipitation, global warming could be expected to increase the
variance of water flows,” due to effects on snowpack melt and other
factors.60
Significantly, climatic effects on water supplies will occur against a
background of increasing water scarcity throughout much of the nation, and
51

CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 201, tbl.4-1.
Id. at 745.
53
Western Water Resources in a Changing Climate: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcomm. on Water and Power 110th Cong.
(2007) (testimony of Philip W. Mote, Ph.D., Climate Impacts Group, University of
Washington,
Seattle)
available
at
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/_files/
MoteTestimony.pdf.
54
Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz, & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and
Freshwater Resources, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV’T (2008) (“The potential for increased demand
due to higher temperatures comes from all types of water use. Domestic use, especially for
outdoor purposes (such as yard and garden irrigation) is expected to rise with warming
temperatures. Industrial use may increase as well. Water is used for cooling on many electrical
generating systems. An increase in water temperature would decrease the cooling efficiency of
the water and require more water to be used. Similarly, demand for water will increase to
compensate for loss of precipitation in many areas.”).
55
See John J. Boland, Assessing Urban Water Use and the Role of Water
Conservation Measures Under Climate Uncertainty, 37 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 157 (1997).
56
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 179.
57
Id.
58
Barnett et al., supra note 50, at 6 (emphasis in original).
59
Gertner, supra note 8, at 70.
60
Fisher & Rubio, supra note 34, at 208.
52
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particularly in the west where urban growth is fueling dramatic increases in
water demand.61 Domestic water use in western states more than doubled
from 1960 to 1990, from 6.5 million acre-feet to 14 million acre-feet, and
continues to climb.62 Per capita water consumption increased throughout the
twenty-first century, despite increased awareness of pressures on water
supplies.63 As populations continue to grow in western states, demand for
water will only increase. Further, demand for instream flows and other water
uses is also increasing, while traditional means of augmenting water supply
through dams, reservoirs, and the like have reached their limits. Without
substantial reforms, existing water institutions will have difficulty meeting
existing demands on water resources, let alone the increased demands
brought about by climate change.
III. THE POWER OF WATER MARKETS
Climate change presents a dilemma for water management. The
gradual warming of the atmosphere is certain to change the distribution and
availability of water supplies. Yet the precise nature, magnitude, timing, and
distribution of such changes are unknown. This uncertainty complicates the
task of water managers who are already faced with escalating demands. “It is
no longer appropriate to assume that past hydrological conditions will
continue into the future (the traditional assumption) and, due to climate
change uncertainty, managers can no longer have confidence in single
projections of the future.”64 One way to manage “the uncertainty associated
with estimates of future climate change is to adopt management measures
that are robust to uncertainty.”65
The climate challenge requires the creation of institutional
arrangements that can foster greater resilience and adaptability in water
management. As the IPCC has observed, “The institutions that govern water
allocation will play a large role in determining the overall social impacts of a
change in water availability, as well as the distribution of gains and losses
across different sectors of society.”66 Existing water management institutions
are already pressed to their limits. There is little question that “current water
law and policy are not up to the new challenges of climate change and
61

A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Can de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable
Water Use: If There Are No “Natural Limits” Should We Worry about Water Supplies?, 27
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 38 (2006) (noting the “projected gap” between urban
water demands and existing water supplies).
62
Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 206
(2007).
63
See Indur M. Goklany, Comparing 20th-Century Trends in U.S. and Global
Agricultural Water and Land Use, in THE WATER REVOLUTION: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO
WATER SCARCITY 25 (Kendra Okonski ed. 2006).
64
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 199.
65
Id. at 200.
66
Id. at 191.
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resulting pressures on freshwater resources.”67 Indeed, “even with a
conservative climate model, current demands on water resources in many
parts of the West will not be met under plausible future climate conditions,
much less the demands of a larger population and a larger economy.”68
Effective institutions must be robust enough to accommodate changes in
water availability by facilitating reallocation of water supplies, while
encouraging cost-effective conservation measures and efficiency
enhancements and remaining sufficiently flexible and adaptable to account
for the uncertain climate forecast.
The demands of current and projected water management challenges
can best be met through a greater reliance on water markets for water
management. As Professor Thompson concludes, “As competing demands
for our limited water supplies grow, and as the possibility of global warming
threatens to increase our water supplies’ year-to-year variability, the need for
robust water markets will increase.”69 Specifically, water management must
shift toward recognition of transferable rights in water that facilitate
voluntary exchanges and the market pricing of water resources. While such
reforms may be difficult, and there are no panaceas for the water
management challenges faced by the western United States, greater use of
water markets offers the best opportunity to adapt to climate change and its
impacts on water supplies. Even the IPCC acknowledges that “improving the
functioning of water markets could help create the kind of flexibility needed
to respond to uncertain changes in future water availability.”70
Markets are powerful institutions for resource allocation. They
facilitate the allocation of resources to their highest value use through
voluntary exchange and the generation of information about relative scarcity
and demand. “The invisible hand of the marketplace is demonstrably far
more efficient in the allocation of scarce resources, in the sense of
maximizing net social welfare, than the invisible hand of politics.” 71 Unlike
administrative allocation methods, water markets provide for the
compensation of those who “lose” from the transfer of water resources.
Markets take advantage of localized and dispersed information about
resource supplies and demands, including subjective valuations and
individualized uses for different resources in different places. Such
information is virtually impossible to centralize in an administrative agency.
Markets allow for the reallocation of risk to those who are best able to bear
the risk of uncertainty.

67

Hall, Stuntz, & Abrams, supra note 54.
Barnett, et al., supra note 50, at 6.
69
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Markets and The Problem of Shifting
Paradigms, in WATER MARKETING – THE NEXT GENERATION 1, 24 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter
J. Hill eds., 1997).
70
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 748.
71
See Huffman, supra note 1, at 432.
68
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While it should be reiterated that markets are not perfect – no human
institutions are without flaws – markets provide a superior institutional
framework for addressing the water management problems global climate
change will create. Markets are essential for the efficient allocation and
distribution of many physical resources. While water marketing presents
some challenges, they are not insuperable. Indeed, “the efficacy of markets
for averting resource shortages is no better demonstrated than with water.”72
A. Market Foundations
Water markets have been used in many parts of the world for the
allocation and distribution of rights in water.73 In the United States, for
instance, water markets emerged in many western states as an outgrowth of
the prior appropriation doctrine, which recognized property rights in water.74
These rights are usufructary rights – that is rights to use water, rather than
rights to the water itself. “Water rights are usufructary not because water is
special or because the public has a particular interest in water but because the
physical nature of water is unique.”75 This may make water markets “more
complex than markets for other resources,” and may increase transaction
costs for water transfers.76 Nonetheless, water rights can be widely
transferable, almost like most any other marketplace good.77 However
limited existing water rights in the U.S. may be, the overall volume of water
transfers is quite substantial and is increasing over time.78 “Efficiency gains
from tradable water rights appear to be significant.”79 Indeed, by some
estimates, the net welfare gains from water markets exceed the value of the
water rights themselves.80
72
Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Introduction: Taking the Plunge, in WATER
MARKETING – THE NEXT GENERATION xi, xi (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
73
For a summary, see Paul Holden & Mateen Thobani, Tradable Water Rights: A
Property Rights Approach to Resolving Water Shortages and Promoting Investment (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1627, July 1996), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1996/07/01/000009265_39
61214131318/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
74
See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law
for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861 (2001)
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“public interest.” See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 19872005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1026 (2007).
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To be most effective, water rights must be well-defined, enforceable,
and transferable.81 The precise contours and content of the rights can vary,
however. Water rights can be defined in terms of actual water volume, a
share of a given water body or water flow, or in terms of the availability of
water of a particular quantity at a given place.82 Water rights can also be
consumptive or non-consumptive, and may or may not be held subject to the
rights of third parties or other water right holders.
Water markets do not only consist of outright sales of water rights.
As water markets evolve over time, potential buyers and sellers develop
contracts and instruments to address specific demands and needs. While
outright transfers of water rights occur, so do various short-term and longterm leases, “sale-leasebacks,”83 and option contracts. Where state law
authorizes the purchase or lease of instream water flows, conservation
organizations have negotiated innovative deals with water rights owners in
order to enhance the habitat value of rivers and streams.84 As the IPCC
observed, “Where feasible, short-term transfers can provide flexibility and
increased security for highly valued water uses such as urban supply, and in
some circumstances may prove more beneficial than constructing additional
storage reservoirs.”85
As with property rights in any other saleable good or commodity,
water rights are the foundation for water markets and can provide substantial
incentives for increased efficiency and allocation of rights to their highest
valued use. “Waste generally rears its ugly head where a transfer of resources
is not permitted.”86 Where an individual is using a transferable resource in an
inefficient or wasteful manner, there is an opportunity for an entrepreneur to
gain from acquiring the resource and putting it to better use. Where rights to
water are transferable, water prices will reflect the value of alternative uses.
This gives the rights holder an incentive to allocate the water to its highest

81
ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23; see also Brewer et al., supra note
77, at 1024 (“Most economists agree that an efficient system of property rights requires three
elements: a complete definition; exclusivity; and transferability.”); RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18-20
(2003).
82
See Holden & Thobani, supra note 73, at 2.
83
As described by Anderson and Snyder, a “sale-leaseback” involves “purchase
of land and water rights followed by lease of the land and water rights back to the sellers.”
ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 103-04. Such contracts can be used to keep agricultural
land in production after the sale of land and adjoining water rights.
84
See Janet C. Neuman, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years
of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 440 (2004) (“The Trust has developed a
number of innovative market devices that go beyond outright water rights purchases to create
transactions that work in varying circumstances with diverse water users.”).
85
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Andrew Morriss et al., Principles for Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 343
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valued use.87 Transferability also creates substantial incentives for
conservation, particularly insofar as rights holders can sell the water they
conserve to other users.88 Such incentives can be quite powerful, particularly
given the wide disparity between the prices agricultural users and others pay
for water in the United States.
Many agricultural users pay little for the water they use, sometimes
nothing more than the cost of pumping the water from a federal irrigation
project to the land where the water will be used.89 The U.S. government has
subsidized agricultural water use for decades, encouraging profligate and
wasteful water use in irrigation. Combined with the fact that property rights
in land have been more well-defined and defended than rights in water,
farmers have more incentive to improve the efficiency of land use than to
focus on efficient water use, and to use water or irrigated land as a substitute
for dry land in the production of crops.90 Between 1910 and 2000, the
amount of crop land in the United States declined by three percent, despite
increased food demand, due to increases in per acre productivity.91 At the
same time, water withdrawals for irrigation increased 251 percent and the
amount of irrigated land increased by over 350 percent.92 In short, this period
saw dramatic increases in agricultural land-use productivity, while water-use
productivity stagnated.93
Simply allowing farmers to sell their water rights to “thirsty cities”
would provide substantial incentives to increase water use efficiency in the
agricultural sector.94 The result is a win-win situation: the farmer receives
payment for giving up water rights that he no longer needs and the “thirsty
city” gets water that it would otherwise not have (or need to pay even more
to obtain). The possibility of a voluntary transaction increases efficiency and
produces gains for buyer and seller alike. The potential for such transfers is
quite large: “It is estimated that 80 percent of consumptive use (CU) of water
in the arid west of the United States is from agriculture, and irrigated land
increased from 3.5 million acres in 1950 to 15 million acres in 1990 . . . .”95
Further, “[i]n the western USA, water-market transactions and other
87
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Morriss, et al., supra note 86, at 336 (“Water markets create incentives for
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Jedidiah Brewer, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker, & Gary Libecap, Water Markets
in the West: Prices, Trading and Contractual Forms (Feb. 2007) (unpublished discussion
paper, filed as no. 07-07 with the Arizona Legal Studies Department).
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Indur M. Goklany, Comparing 20th Century Trends in U.S. and Global
Agricultural Water and Land Use, 27 WATER INTL. 321 (2002), available at
http://members.cox.net/igoklany/Water%20International%202002.pdf.
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Id. at 321-22.
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Id. at 322.
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Id. at 325-26.
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Brewer, et al., supra note 77, at 1022-23.
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Elgaali et al., supra note 38, at 442.
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negotiated transfers of water from agricultural to urban or environmental
uses are increasingly being used to accommodate long-term changes in
demand (e.g. due to population growth) as well as short-term needs arising
from drought emergencies.”96 This would provide significant benefits in the
context of climate change. As the IPCC itself has noted:
If water supplies decline in particular locations or seasons,
water markets could soften the impacts by moving water
from lower to higher valued uses. In the western United
States, where irrigation now accounts for more than 80% of
consumptive water use, water market activity is likely to
continue the current trend of movement of water out of
irrigated agriculture to accommodate other water uses.97
With water markets, buyers and sellers of water rights get to
determine what water is worth to them, and make decisions about whether to
engage in voluntary transfers accordingly. Where transfers occur, it is
because a buyer values the water more than the seller. Thus, water transfers
reallocate water rights from lower value uses to higher value uses, producing
a more efficient allocation of the resource. Insofar as some users, or wouldbe water users, hold particularly idiosyncratic value preferences, these are
also incorporated into the price, as water rights are only transferred when
both buyer and seller agree.
B. Prices and Information
Prices are an essential component of working markets.98 Price
signals and the potential to profit from differences in valuation provide
powerful incentives for innovation. Those who uncover ways to facilitate
trades or increase efficiency can profit from such discoveries. Price signals
provide powerful incentives for conservation while simultaneously
communicating information about collective judgments about the relative
scarcity of resources across time and space.
Prices enable markets to operate as a powerful coordination
mechanism. Prices communicate information about the relative scarcity of
goods and services in various places, and the valuation placed upon the good
for current and alternative uses.99 As market conditions fluctuate, market
prices change accordingly. As environmental economist Richard Stroup
explains, “market prices adjust constantly to all of the supply and demand
variables, providing each buyer and each seller with up-to-date information
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CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 198.
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See generally STROUP, supra note 81, at 27-29.
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on changes in relative values in the world around them.”100 This function is
performed in a hyper-efficient manner, particularly in comparison to
administrative mechanisms that seek to measure relative scarcity, and
enables market participants to take account of changing market conditions
without specific knowledge about such conditions. Such information is
communicated in the market price.
Through the price system, markets incorporate and account for far
more information than centralized administrative entities, and at far less
cost.101 This is important because information is both extremely valuable,
and quite costly to uncover and accumulate.102 “By conveying the alternative
valuations of resources, prices enable market actors to compare their present
use of a resource to the potential use others might make of it without
knowing the details of those potential uses.”103 Accumulating and processing
the same volume of information through an administrative process would be
exceedingly costly, and would be difficult (if not impossible) to achieve in as
timely a fashion.
A regulatory system that seeks to limit the amount of water used for
various purposes to “appropriate” amounts would require the collection and
consideration of myriad amounts of information concerning the relevant
information about how water is and could be used within various industries
in different places and at different times. Such efforts rarely succeed as
planned because centralized decision-makers are not able to collect and
process a sufficient volume of information.104 An adaptive system, such as is
required to respond adequately to the threat of climate change, is even more
information intensive.105 A market system, in which users pay for the
resource that they use, enables individual water users to weigh the trade-off
between the cost of obtaining additional water, the cost of reducing or
conserving water use, and other relevant factors. Such decentralized
approaches may sacrifice the potential for “expert” centralized water
management, but they make greater use of specialized knowledge about
individual circumstances and preferences.106 As Professor Andrew Morriss
100

STROUP, supra note 81, at 27; see also Morriss, supra note 80, at 988 (“Market
prices respond to events quickly, sending market participants signals about the impact of
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observes, “it is markets’ connection with real choices, made by real people
with real consequences for the people making the choices that enables
markets to value resources, including water, in a fashion that leads to better
outcomes than the alternatives.”107
When unforeseen events alter resource supply and demand, prices
quickly shift to account for the relevant changes. In this fashion, market
institutions “encourage individuals to adapt to changed circumstances.”108
Markets also quickly incorporate – and market prices reflect – changing
values and increased knowledge about a particular resource. If a new
technology increases or decreases demand for the resource in question, prices
will respond as individual buyers and sellers begin to take account of this
new development.
C. Prices and Efficiency
Another reason to rely upon market pricing for water is that it will
encourage consumers to use water more efficiently. The use of price
mechanisms, such as drought demand rates, can “enhance the efficiency of
water resource allocation among customers.”109 Price-related measures that
can encourage greater conservation include excess surcharges, drought
demand rates, variable seasonal rates and time of use rates.110
While potentially more effective than other demand control
measures, use of market prices is not always politically popular, and political
authorities are often responsible for making retail-level water pricing
decisions.111 Water is heavily subsidized throughout the United States,
particularly in the agricultural sector, which accounts for the vast majority of
western water use. As a general matter, water prices are below prices that
would prevail in competitive markets.112 As Professor Glennon laments, “the
price of water in the United States is ridiculously low.”113 In some cities,
there is little charge for water, and water use is not even measured.114 Even
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Id. at 988.
109
Williams James Smith, Jr. & Young-Doo Wang, Conservation Rates: The Best
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where water is metered, only rarely do consumers pay for the actual costs of
the water they use, largely due to political pressures.115
Given that most consumers pay artificially low water prices, few
have much incentive to economize on their water use. Profligate water use is
a predictable response to artificially low water rates – rates that are
effectively subsidized by government management or political interventions
in the marketplace. As economists Anderson and Snyder explain, “[w]hat is
seen as waste or inefficient water use in rural or urban areas is simply the
users’ rational response to low water prices.”116 This is the direct result of
longstanding government policy: “Water prices have been kept artificially
low, and the inevitable shortages have followed. Governments have
responded by attempting to restrain demand, ration water, and increase the
available supply.”117
It is often assumed that residential water demand is “relatively price
inelastic,” and therefore price changes will not produce dramatic changes in
water use patterns.118 This position is maintained by many water policy
experts and administrators.119 Yet experience shows that many water users
will reduce water consumption when faced with higher prices. The
responsiveness of different water users, at different times and places, will
vary, but users will respond.120 “If the price of water rose, people would
carefully examine how they use water, for what purposes, and in what
quantity.”121 Further, if water users are able to transfer their water rights to
others, they may respond to higher prices by selling their water to those with
higher value water uses.
Empirical evidence finds that “both sides of the market exhibit
surprising price responsiveness or elasticity.”122 Faced with higher prices,
consumers will prioritize and economize their water use.123 Different
115
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residential consumers will respond differently to changes in water prices,
however.124 According to one study: “Aggregate single family household
demand was responsive to price changes. However price responsiveness
varied seasonally. In particular, aggregate demand was 25% more price
responsive in the summer months, reflecting the more discretionary nature of
outdoor water use.”125
Increased efficiency can have a dramatic effect on water use
patterns. Water use can vary significantly by locality, even within regions.
For example, the average resident of Los Angeles uses approximately 125
gallons of water per day, whereas the average resident of Tucson only uses
114 gallons.126 Surprisingly enough, the United States, as a whole, uses less
water today than it did 25 years ago, according to Peter Gleick of the Pacific
Institute. 127
Water usage rates vary substantially within individual industries.128
In the residential sector, strikingly different water use patterns emerge based
on how water is priced. Professor Glennon reports that per capita water use is
approximately 300 gallons per day in Fresno, California, where water use is
not metered.129 In the neighboring community of Clovis, however, water is
metered, and per capita water use is thirty three percent lower.130 In the
1970s, price increases and other measures reduced the average peak daily
water demand by approximately 20 percent.131
In agriculture, where the potential for water use savings may be
greatest, price increases create incentives for producers to “substitute labor
and capital for water,” and use more efficient, and less water-intensive,
irrigation techniques.132 Forced to pay the market value of water, many
agricultural users may sell their water to other users who can better afford its
higher cost. These agricultural users would also find conservation measures
to be better investments than before, particularly if they could sell any
conserved water.133 “Rate increases would encourage the elimination of
marginal economic activities and the movement of water toward more
productive uses,” and encourage technological innovation as well.134
Allowing water prices to fluctuate with changes in supply and
demand would likely force many consumers to pay significantly more for
water, particularly in areas where water is heavily subsidized. As a
124
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consequence, some are concerned that price mechanisms are regressive. Yet
given the choice between price mechanisms, rationing, and mandatory
restrictions, pricing is the “most timely and equitable approach” to managing
drought-induced supply shortfalls.135
“An underappreciated but significant advantage” of price
mechanisms is their “positive environmental impact.”136 “The reduction in
the consumption of water allows for an increased amount of water to remain
in the natural environment, thus buoying ecological systems and
multistakeholder user rights in a manner championed in integrated water
resources management literature.”137 Even rather modest reforms, such as the
implementation of drought demand surcharges can “make an immediate and
powerful short-term positive impact both in terms of supply and ecology.”138
Public water authorities are reluctant to subject consumers to higher
prices, even during drought conditions. Increasing water rates imposes
visible costs on their constituents, and risks political unpopularity. Public
officials would rather impose moratoria on “wasteful” water uses than
subject water use to the discipline of price changes that reflect market
conditions.139 This is a particularly inefficient way to manage water
consumption because it ignores the heterogeneity of consumer preferences
and the marginal benefits arising from different users who alter their
consumption in different ways.140 “Under-pricing water and restricting its use
by law and tradition result in inefficient use, lost development opportunities,
interruptions in service, and higher costs for new users.”141
Where price is used instead of a command-and-control use
restriction, individual users can alter their water use so as to ensure that they
are maximizing their utility. If there is a concern that temporary price
increases resulting from drought conditions are regressive, this could be
addressed through targeted, means-tested subsidies for those in need without
sacrificing the underlying benefits of a reliance upon price signals to
encourage more efficient use.142
Some further oppose the use of prices to manage water supplies
because water is viewed as a necessity, or even a right, rather than an
135
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economic good.143 Yet as Professor Huffman observes, it is precisely water’s
“specialness,” and resulting scarcity, that requires its allocation through
institutions that maximize efficiency; for “it is abundantly clear that no social
institution yet conceived will yield greater net social welfare from a scarce
resource than a well-functioning market.”144
D. Accounting for Uncertainty
One of the greatest challenges posed by climate change is the
uncertainty it magnifies, if not creates. The precise scope, timing and
location of its effect on water supplies are uncertain. The range of potential
effects in any given place is quite large. Traditional planning tools are poorly
equipped to address climatic effects on water supplies. “Even under the
presumption of a stable climate, imprecise hydrologic information is now
frequently at the heart of costly conflicts over proposed water transfers and
new water developments.”145 As Kenneth Frederick of Resources for the
Future explains, “to plan for and justify expensive new projects when the
magnitude, timing, and even the direction of the changes are unknown . . .
Building for changes that never materialize or failing to build facilities to
deal with changes that do occur are both potentially costly.”146 Those
administrative agencies tasked with water management have been quite timid
in modernizing or reforming their management strategies to account for
current and projected stresses on water supplies, and have done little to
prepare for the threat of climate change.147 As the IPCC further concluded,
“water planners need to recognize that it is not possible to resolve all
uncertainties, so it would not be wise to base decisions on only one, or a few,
climate model scenarios. Rather, making use of probabilistic assessments of
future hydrological changes may allow planners to better evaluate risks and
response options.”148 Such uncertainty also highlights the need for flexible
and adaptive water management institutions.
Water markets can both reduce uncertainty for water users and
provide security against the harms that uncertainty can produce.149 If water
users are able to purchase additional water rights from other users, this can
143
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reduce the impact of droughts and other local or temporal supply
disruptions.150 While all water users in a given region may suffer from
drought conditions, the costs to some water users may be greater than others.
Transferable water rights enable water users to shift these costs to those who
are best able to bear them, thereby reducing the overall costs of such
unforeseen supply disruptions.151 The availability to transfer water also
reduces “the cost of sudden reductions in water supply resulting from
droughts . . . by permitting reallocation of the remaining water to its highest
uses.”152
Such flexibility is an important virtue of water markets.
While certainty of supply remains a dominant concern for
water users in the western states, flexibility to move water
from one type of use to another has become increasingly
valuable. The value of flexibility is reflected in the
increasing numbers of market transfers of water rights
throughout the region and in efforts to devise new
mechanisms to facilitate short-term transfers of water
entitlements.153
Flexibility helps water users accommodate potential risks to water supplies,
and is quite valuable as a result.
The ability to transfer water rights in advance of potential supply
changes also enables water users to reallocate the risk of uncertainty.154
Water users can acquire options that will enable them to obtain water
necessary to address unanticipated changes in future supply. As in
commodity markets, such options are an important risk management
instrument. This “ability of markets to ‘shift’ uncertainty is important both
because the law might mistakenly misallocate the burden of uncertainty and
because the government cannot always determine who can best bear the
burden” of uncertainty or unanticipated losses.155 As compared to
administrative allocations, markets are a far superior, and far more flexible
and adaptable, means of accommodating uncertainty. As Professor Morriss
explains:
Water use, even if optimized today, must change tomorrow
to remain optimal. A planned solution is thus unable to
remain optimal without continual readjustment. Market
solutions, on the other hand, allow for continuous
adjustment without central intervention. Reaching a planned
optimum requires a great deal of information to be available
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to the planner. Markets, by contrast, allow decentralized
processing of information.156
IV. THE MOVE TO MARKETS
It may well be that the most efficient systems of water markets
evolve over time and cannot simply be imposed from above by government
fiat.157 Yet there are still several steps government agencies can take to
facilitate the development of water markets and greater reliance upon market
institutions in the allocation and management of water resources. The steps
include 1) defining, and recognizing the security and transferability of
property rights in water resources; 2) eliminating government subsidies for
water use and distribution; 3) moving toward market-based prices for water;
and 4) identifying and reducing legal and regulatory barriers to water
transfers, particularly interbasin and interstate water transfers.158
Existing obstacles to water markets include regulatory barriers,
“inconsistent legal paradigms, opposition by government agencies that
control much of the water and key transportation facilities, and to a growing
extent, concerns about the impact of transfers on exporting communities.”159
State rules that limit the lease and sale of water unduly obstruct the
development of efficient water markets.160 Many regulatory jurisdictions
deliberately inhibit water transfers outside of their jurisdiction.161 The threat
of administrative expropriation can also discourage private investments that
would facilitate water transfers.162 Overall, the more governmental agencies
are involved in water distribution and allocation, the greater the obstacles to
water markets.163
The single most important step administrative agencies and lawmaking bodies can take is to recognize and protect water rights so as to
provide the institutional foundation upon which water markets may be built
or evolve. As Professor Thompson observes, “By providing the legal
infrastructure for water markets and actively encouraging such markets, the
government can help reduce the harm from uncertainty in water rights and
156
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deliveries.”164 The unfortunate reality is that “the way to water marketing has
been strewn with the obstacles of a legal regime designed to secure water,
often with the benefit of taxpayer subsidies, to politically influential water
users.”165 Therefore, “because of water law’s historic hostility toward
markets, water markets need all of the government affirmation and support
they can get.”166
According to Professor Howe, the most important legal change to
encourage greater efficiency in water use is “salvage legislation” that ensures
that those who manage to reduce their consumptive use of water do not
suffer reductions in their water rights as a result.167 In many states, farmers
and other rights owners operate under a “use it or lose it” regime that only
recognizes the validity of water rights for certain uses recognized as
“beneficial.”168 A consequence of such rules is that there is little incentive to
improve water use efficiency.169 Under “salvage legislation,” however, those
who conserve water would acquire a valuable commodity: a transferable
water right that could be sold or put to other uses.
Legal and administrative barriers are not the only obstacles to greater
water marketing. In some cases, water transfers are simply too costly to
complete due to transportation or other transaction costs. Where there are no
legal or institutional barriers to such trades, however, the potential for a
wealth-maximizing trade creates incentives for would-be entrepreneurs to
uncover ways of lowering such transaction costs so as to make a deal. This
does not mean other concerns should be ignored. Special accommodations
may have to be made for water markets to adequately take account of
instream flows and sensitive biological resources.170 But such
accommodations should be made in the context of water markets, and such
concerns should not be an excuse to forestall market reforms. Indeed, water
markets have substantial environmental benefits, including increasing
opportunities for conservation organizations to directly influence water
allocation decisions as market participants.171 In many places,
“environmental interests have actively supported improved transferability of
164
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water rights, because they see market transfers as an environmentally less
damaging alternative to new dams.”172
While much ink is spilled over concerns that allowing water
transfers could harm those communities from which water is transferred,
water markets provide a more equitable means of water transfer than the
administrative alternatives.173 In water markets, water is transferred as a
result of voluntary transactions between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Those who had rights to water are compensated for giving up their rights.
While there still may be third parties who suffer indirect effects from the
water transfer, this is true under any water transfer scenario. Only in the
absence of water markets are such losses compounded by the public harms
resulting from inefficient water allocation and waste.
One transitional measure that has shown much promise is the
implementation of water banks to facilitate regional transfers. A water bank
essentially operates as a clearinghouse to facilitate the rental of surplus water
where it is needed. Among the benefits of water banks is that they can reduce
the transaction costs associated with contracting for water transfers.174
Further, transfers conducted through water banks “clash less with the public
resource paradigm” and existing regulatory institutions than do pure, openmarket transfers of water.175 California has had positive experiences with the
use of water banks. In the 1970s, a temporary federal water bank helped
alleviate drought impacts.176 In the 1990s, the California Department of
Water Resources created water banks that efficiently reallocated large
volumes of water among both public and private users.177 Water banks have
been used in Idaho as well.178

V. CONCLUSION
Climate change presents many challenges, but it also presents
opportunities. In the case of water, the need to prepare for the impact of
climatic warming creates an opportunity to improve on existing institutions.
In particular, the threat of climate change could provide the long-needed
impetus to shift away from centralized political management of water
resources, toward market-based institutions. Such a shift holds the potential
to increase the efficiency and environmental soundness of water use in the
United States.
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Climate change is ultimately a problem about environmental risk,
albeit a very large risk. Risk management polices can be viewed as various
types of insurance. The purpose of such policies is to reduce the risk up
front, provide compensation in the event of loss, or to otherwise reduce the
likelihood or magnitude of future losses. To be worthwhile, however, the
cost of insurance premiums must be justified by the degree of risk reduction
or protection that is acquired. Given the relatively high costs of emission
controls at present, the technological obstacles to wide-scale carbon
sequestration, and the comparatively low cost of some adaptation measures,
the ideal form of insurance for climate change will consist of a combination
of mitigation and adaptation measures. In the case of water, the development
of market institutions is a particularly apt form of adaptation.
Water markets are not a panacea. As the IPCC concluded, “although
well-functioning water markets may ameliorate socioeconomic impacts of
reduced water availability, they cannot completely eliminate the adverse
impacts of a drying scenario.”179 In practice, “[t]he effectiveness of water
marketing in promoting flexible adaptation to prospective climate change
will depend on the nature of the markets.” 180 Despite these limitations, water
markets should play a central role in efforts to mitigate the potential harms of
climate change within the water sector.
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